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This thesis analyzes current U.S. Army defensive doctrine
of committing a force forward of the main battle area as a
covering force. It presents a theory for the correct assess-
ment of covering force effectiveness and the applicability
of Lanchester-type models to represent this tactic is demon-
strated. Several simple Lanchester-type models are used to
analyze the commitment of the covering force and its contri-
bution to the total defensive battle. The key elements of
combat dynamics are identified and modelled. A computer-
based model is constructed and run iteratively to determine
the optimal percentage of forces to be deployed as a cover-
ing force in various defensive situations.
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I. A BASIS FOR ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
The current U.S. Array doctrine for defense centers around
the word ACTIV2. In an active defense, forces engage the
enemy from battle positions that make maximum use of advan-
tageous terrain and allow forces to attrite the enemy at the
maximum effective range of U.S. weapon systems. When appro-
priate, units will move from battle position to battle posi-
tion, so they can continually exploit the advantage of the
defender on prepared terrain, make use of obstacles (natural
and manmade ) , and engage the enemy in a series of ambushes
at long range (Ref. 1).
The defensive area is organized as depicted in Figure 1
(Ref. 2). It consists of the Covering Force Area (CFA), the
Main Battle Area (MBA), and the Rear Area. (See Appendix A
for definitions of terms used in this thesis.
)
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the covering
force; its commitment and contribution to the total defensive
effort. By building some simple Lanchester-type differential
combat models, important questions such as the identification
of key combat dynamics, optimal force commitment, and concen-



















THE DEFENSIVE AREA (Ref. 2)
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B. CONCENTRATION AND LANCHESTER 1 S ORIGINAL WORK
In 191^. P. W. Lanchester, in an attempt to quantitatively
justify the principle of concentration of forces under modern
conditions, formulated the classic mathematical equations that
describe combat between two opposing homogeneous forces. His
hypothesis was that under "modern conditions" firepower can
be concentrated on opposing forces so that each side's casualty
rate is proportional to the number of enemy firers. Under
these conditions, it may be shown that a victorious side can
significantly reduce its casualties by initially committing
as many forces as possible. Conversely, a commander dilutes
his combat power by committing his forces "piecemeal".
"Modern conditions" are those that stem from the techno-
logy that has produced weapons that can accurately deliver a
projectile on a long-range target, thus allowing the concen-
tration of firepower by weapons widely separated on the battle-
field. Modern, in this context, is opposed to "ancient condi-
tions" of combat whereby forces engaged one another in hand to
hand combat using edged weapons. Under ancient conditions
the capability to concentrate weapon effect on a single target
from widely located positions on the battlefield does not exist.
Thus, Lanchester hypothesized that under "modern conditions"
a side's casualty rate would be proportional to the number of







where t denotes battle time (t=0, is the start of the battle)
and r and b are constants, called Lanchester attrition-rate
coefficients, that represent the effectiveness of each side f s
fire.
The instantaneous casualty ratio is obtained from equations
(1.D
dB u rR (1 2)dR bB ' u,£i;
whence integration yields Lanchester ! s familiar Square Law:
b(B2 - B2 ) = r(R2 - R2 ) (1.3)
The advantages of concentration are apparent from this
state equation, since the effective strength of one side is
proportional to the first power of its efficiency (its attri-
tion coefficient) but proportional to the square of the number
of combatants entering the engagement. Two opposing forces
are then equally matched in a fight to the finish when the









Consequently, it is more profitable for a victorious side
to increase the number of combatants in an engagement than it
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is to increase (by the same amount) the exchange rate (by
increasing the effectiveness of the individual weapons).
Said in another way; a tactical or strategic use of concen-
tration may adequately counterbalance any moderate advantage
in weapon efficiency*
C. BATTLE TERMINATION
Without further specification, combat attrition will
follow the above schedule in an engagement until one side or
the other is annihilated to terminate the engagement. But
such engagements that continue until one side is wiped out
are rare. Historically, battles end when one side or the
other reaches a force level below which it is no longer able
to carry out its mission. At that point in the battle the
losing side either withdraws from the field of battle or
surrenders.
The possible battle outcomes are discussed by R, L,
Helmbold (Ref. 3). They are:
1 ) One side has been annihilated, with its opponent
in undisputed control of the battlefield,
2) One side surrenders and submits to the will of
its opponent, who thereby gains control of the battlefield,
3) Neither side surrenders or is annihilated, but one
of them has disengaged and either has withdrawn, or is in




ij.) Neither side has surrendered or been annihilated,
but both sides have disengaged and are in the process of
withdrawing from the battlefield. Mutual withdrawal
leaves control of the battlefield uncertain, with no
certain victor.
For simplicity Taylor (Ref. I4.) and Helmbold (Ref. 5),
consider control of the battlefield as the criterion for
victory. A3 implied above, the opponent who controls the
battlefield is the side that retains its combat effectiveness
while the other reaches a force level that renders it combat
ineffective.
In modelling the battle termination phenomenon one con-
siders a combat force to have reached its "breakpoint" when
it reaches that force level at which it loses its combat
effectiveness. At some percentage of its original strength
a unit will lose its ability to influence the action and will
abandon its mission, forcing it to "break off" the engagement,
leaving its opponent in possession of the field of battle
(Ref. 6). The important question here (addressed by Taylor,
Helmbold, etc.) is the determination of the significant
factors upon which battle termination depends. Many can be
considered, but few can actually be quantified. Those factors





2) Size of unit
3) Mission of the unit (attack or defend)
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These factors have been incorporated and expressed as the
Breakpoint Hypothesis (Ref. 7):
"Breakpoint Hypothesis": A unit will cease to
be an effective fighting force in combat when a
given force level is reached. When this event
happens, the unit loses its ability to perform its
mission and will "break-off" the engagement. This
force level breakpoint depends on the type of unit,
its size and mission."
Then, the force level at which a unit ceases to be combat
effective is that unit f s breakpoint force level (or simply
breakpoint). The major assumption here is that the first
unit that reaches its breakpoint loses the engagement. Using
common notation (Ref. 8); if two homogeneous forces enter the
field of combat against one another, Red (R) versus Blue (B),
then Red's breakpoint is denoted as R„ and 31ue's breakpoint
is similarly defined as Bg .




B wins when B- > Bg (1 .1;)
B(t) > BB and R(t)> RR for 0< t^ tf
where the f subscript denotes the final values of the Red force,
the Blue force and time at the end of the battle, and B(t) and
R(t) denote the Red and Blue force levels at some time, t
,
during the action. It is also convenient to express a unit's
breakpoint in terms of its initial strength, i.e.:
HBp = fBp- Ro
16

where Red's breakpoint force level is equal to some fraction
(0 ^ffL<: 1.0) of Red's initial force level (R ). If theDP O
Red commander chose to fight until the last man, the battle
termination criteria would then revert to the simple Lanches-
ter outcome where Red fought to annihilation. Red's break-
R Rpoint force level would then be RQ = f„ • R where ft, =0Dp Dp O Dp
and R = 0.
Dp
R BThe above breakpoint hypotheses implies that f_ and f_,Dp Dp
depend on the unit's type, size and mission. Common values
attributed to these breakpoint fractions for company-sized
units are:
f3 =0.5 for a defending force and
ft =0.7 for an attacking force.Dp
An interesting result of this model of battle termination
is that, depending on a unit's breakpoint, the victor could
be that force that has a smaller number of forces remaining
on the battlefield. Reaching one's breakpoint means that
one's mission must be abandoned. Thus, an attacker may give
up his attack because he is not strong enough to prosecute it,
although he may be numerically stronger than the defender.
For example, imagine Red attacking Blue with a force of
200 (R = 200), and Blue is defending and numbers 100 (B = 100).
Then if fg =0.7 and fg = 0.5, the battle could end with
Blue victorious with B- = 75 and Red the loser with R~ = R„ =
11+0. Red has reached its breakpoint Rg^ = (.5) (100) = 50,
since Bf = 75 > BR = 50* Blue has retained its combat
17

effectiveness and has achieved victory with fewer forces
remaining at the end of the battle. This result can only be
achieved, however, when the smaller Blue force has a combat
advantage over the larger Red force. This combat advantage
exists in the model when Blue's attrition coefficient exceeds
Red's attrition coefficient, i.e., b )>r to such a degree that
Blue attrites Red at a faster rate than Red attrites Blue.
D. THE USE OP A SIMPLE METHOD
Current models of combat vary in level of detail from
simple, deterministic, force-on-force Lanchester-type analy-
tical models that represent all the complexity of combat in a
few differential equations, to high-resolution Monte-Carlo
computer-based models that simulate in minute detail the
interaction of such combat variables as terrain, weapon char-
acteristics and individual movement. All models are abstrac-
tions from reality. For complex man-machine systems (such as
military organization) there is always a trade-off between the
levels of detail, convenience and accessibility, and opera-
tional realism. Analysis in this paper choses simplicity and
ease of computation over complexity and high resolution.
A simple model (here considered to be an analytical model)
can be constructed on the basis of several simple assumptions.
Assumptions, such as "modern conditions" of warfare, may
remove the model from reality, but allow the modeller to
construct a logical structure that can be enriched, and from
18

which important insights can be drawn. An example can be
easily found in Lanchester's aimed fire law. The logical
structure was that modern weapons could be brought to bear
on enemy targets from widely located positions. So that a
force's attrition rate over time was directly proportional
to the number of opposing forces and the combat effectiveness
of each member of the opposing force. Prom this logical
structure, a mathematical model was formed that, when manipu-
lated, showed that concentration of forces in the battle
achieved better results than when forces were not concentrated
(Ref. 9).
Probably the most important use of the simple model is
obtaining insights into the dynamics of combat (Ref. 10). The
simple model allows the analyst to better understand the basic
nature of combat dynamics, and to "...hopefully perceive some
significant interrelationships that are difficult to discern
in more complicated models." (Ref. 11 ).
The goal of the simple combat model is then one of explor-
ing the dynamics, discovering the significant variables, and
evaluating the sensitivity of the parameters and assumptions
within a logical framework.
In the following analysis of the covering force, such a
simple model is used to gain the insights, interrelationships,
and sensitivity previously mentioned. This analysis cannot,
nor is meant to, give definitive answers to specific problems
of covering force commitment.
19

II. THE DYNAMICS OF THS DEFENSIVE 3ATTLS
A. INTRODUCTION
The intent of this chapter is to present some of the
important dynamics of the defensive battle, the relationship
between the MBA and the CFA, the approach in examining the
contribution of the covering force, and the measures of
effectiveness that will be used in later chapters.
B. THE DEFENSIVE BATTLE
The covering force area (denoted as CFA) was defined in
Chapter I, and is the area forward of the FEBA in which the
covering force is committed. For the sake of the analysis
in this thesis, the defensive force (Blue) has an initial
force size denoted as B . If some percentage (p • 100%, where
<Tp <" 1 ) of the initial force, B , is committed to the CFA,
this covering force has an initial force size of B • p.° o
The mission of the covering force, as expressed in FM 100-$ ,
Operations is
:
"...to fight in a specified area for a specified
period of time... to find ways not only to deceive the
enemy as to the MBA dispositions, but also to trade
space for time - time for the MBA force to get set to
defend. Therefore, the covering force mission may be
a delay, which could be terrain - specific, time-specific,
or both."
Dynamically, the covering force would fight from key
terrain to key terrain (battle position to battle position)
in keeping with the concept of the active defense. It would
attempt to maintain continuous contact with the enemy, slow
20

his rate of advance, force him to reveal his main attack,
inflict maximum enemy attrition, and provide continuous enemy
intelligence to the MBA commander. The covering force in the
delay will trade space for time, usually at the least risk
to its survival. However, it may also be required to "trade
risk for time" (Ref. 12). In order to gain enough time, the
covering force may have to fight harder and longer on each
battle position, thus risking greater losses. Sufficient
resistance must be presented to the enemy to force him to
commit his main attack, but the covering force commander must
not allow himself to become so decisively engaged as to risk
the destruction of his force.
On order, the covering force will conduct a rearward
passage of lines through the FEBA and hand the battle over
to the MBA forces. The covering force can them assume several
missions, the most probable being to participate in the MBA
battle after resupply, consolidation and reorganization.
The organization of the covering force will be predomi-
nantly armored cavalry and air cavalry, reinforced with suf-
ficient tank, antitank, mechanized infantry, field artillery,
air defense artillery, engineer and attack helicopter forces
to accomplish the mission (Ref. 13)»
It is submitted that the most critical tasks of the cover-
ing force in support of the defensive effort are the acquisi-
tion of enemy intelligence and the gaining of time. But these
are not independent contributions, since one without the other
21

is of little use to the forces in the MBA. To illustrate
this point, suppose that the covering force was able to
delay the enemy attack for the required amount of time to
enable the MBA forces to concentrate at the critical areas,
but the covering force was unable to force the enemy into
revealing his main attack. In this scenario, the MBA forces
could react to enemy intelligence but none was available.
Or, for another example, suppose that the covering force was
able to correctly identify the avenue of advance of the main
enemy attack, but was unable to slow the enemy advance suffi-
ciently to gain the required amount of time needed to maneuver
MBA forces to counter the identified thrust. Again, with only
one element of the crucial two, the MBA force could not attain
the "combat advantage" required to defeat the enemy.
The term "combat advantage" implies that the commitment
of some percentage of the defensive forces to the GPA must
provide an advantage to the forces in the MBA. The nature
of this advantage should be explored.
During the course of the action in the GPA, the MBA forces
will continue to improve their defensive posture by upgrading
firing positions, implacing obstacles, and by moving logistic
support forward. These improvements take time; time provided
by the tenacious action of the covering force. However, if
time is supplemented by accurate enemy intelligence, then not
only can the MBA forces improve their combat effectiveness,
but they can also redistribute themselves in order to
22

concentrate their forces at the critical areas and use econ-
omy of force tactics in areas of secondary importance.
The covering force can provide the crucial elements of
enemy intelligence and time by exploiting the terrain, en-
gaging the enemy in ambush fashion at the maximum range of
its weapons, and maintaining a mobility advantage over the
attacker through the use of obstacles and superior knowledge
and U3e of terrain.
The question of how long the covering force battle will
last varies from scenario to scenario. Col. T. N. Dupuy
(U.S. Army, Retired) in his book Numbers, Predictions and
War does a campaign analysis of the defensive battle in
Central Europe, in which he addresses this question (Ref. II4.K
He postulates that the covering force battle will last about
2J4- hours depending on whether or not the enemy main attack is
in the sector being analyzed in combination with whether or
not the enemy has achieved surprise in this sector. (In
later chapters, the battle duration time of 2l± hours will be
used as a means of modelling the intensity of combat in the
CPA).
C. EVALUATING THE COVERING FORCE
For several important reasons, the basic assumption, will
be made that the CFA battle and the MBA battle are two distinct
battles. It must be acknowledged, however, that this concep-
tualization may not always agree with real-world combat opera-
tions for several reasons. Firstly, it is very possible that
23

the covering force may be able to defeat the enemy prior to
his reaching the FEBA. For another, the fluidity of the
battlefield suggests the possibility of the enemy reaching
the FEBA by penetrating the covering force and being engaged
by both the covering force and MBA forces simultaneously.
However, as will be seen in subsequent chapters, the model
building process will depend greatly on the assumption of
two distinct battles. The relaxation of this assumption
would put the model building process into such a high level
of resolution that certain amounts of transparency would be
lost.
Before proceeding to the modelling efforts, a discussion
of the assessment of covering force effectiveness seems in
order* Initially, it was considered that focusing on the
GFA battle and its outcome would offer sufficient insights
into the effectiveness of the covering force in any parti-
cular scenario. It was thought that the winner of the CFA
battle, the duration of the GFA battle, the number of enemy
and friendly casualties would give a sufficient basis upon
which to draw conclusions concerning optimum covering force
commitment and tactics. However, one must give pause, and
consider that even though the defensive effort has been
partitioned into two separate battles, the final outcome of
the final battle is the only true indicator of whether or
not any strategy, tactic, or force commitment in the CFA
was effective. The criteria for assessing the combat
2k

effectiveness of any component must rest on the overall out-
come of the total defensive battle. It is submitted that
the only appropriate way to analyze the contributions of the
covering force is to analyze how any change in covering force
dynamics affects the final outcome and not merely the outcome
of the CPA battle.
A good example of how a CPA battle analysis that focuses
on the wrong system-effectiveness criterion leads to erro-
neous conclusions can be seen when the analyst focuses only
upon the win or lose criteria in the outcome of the *CFA
battle. If the analyst believes that a Blue win in the
covering force battle provides adequate proof that the
covering force was effective, he may overlook the fact that
the MBA forces were deprived of forces to make the covering
force of sufficient size to win the GFA battle. He may miss
the fact that the depleted MBA forces could not concentrate
sufficiently to defeat an enemy penetration. The possibility
exists that the enemy, by a second echelon attack could pene-
trate to the flimsy forces of the MBA and continue relatively
unopposed to his objective in the rear area. In this case
the enemy could achieve victory in the final outcome of the
defensive battle, regardless of suffering defeat at the hands
of the covering force.
In contrast, if the covering force loses the CPA battle,
but can sustain its action long enough to contribute time and
enemy information, the enemy may be defeated in the MBA and
25

thus fail to reach his objective. These two simple examples
illustrate the fundamental point that the covering force ! s
contribution to the total defensive battle can only be eval-
uated in the final outcome. Further analysis will depend
upon the acceptance of this key premise.
The measures of effectiveness that are to be used in the
analysis presented in future chapters must reflect the con-
tribution of the covering force to the total force effort.
These measures of effectiveness are:
1) Defender (Blue) casualties,
2) Attacker (Red) casualties,
3) The loss ratio, Blue over Red casualties,
If.) The loss difference, Blue minus Red casualties,
5) Winner of the MBA battle.
The above measures of effectiveness are preferred at
their minimum value, except for Red casualties. The winner
of the MBA battle is strictly nominal data and is the sort
of measure of effectiveness associated with a Yes-No or 0-1
outcome. This measure of effectiveness is optimum where Blue
wins the MBA battle, thus attaining the final victory in the
total defensive battle.
III. AN APPLICATION OF THE GAH0W-ZIMMERMAN MODSL
A. INTRODUCTION
In recent times the U.S. Army analysis community has
viewed the covering force and its contribution to the defen-
sive battle, from the perspective of defense in Central Europe,
26

This perspective cannot be reproached since the political
realities and consequences of defeat in that area provide
severe repercussions to national security and world peace.
However, Army defensive doctrine is not limited in applica-
bility to that particular scenario. In this chapter a more
general scenario is presented so that an initial analysis
of the covering force and its dynamics can be made with a
more transparent analytical model than the models presented
in later chapters.
B. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS (Ref. 15)
In order to model the general defensive formation con-
sisting of a GFA and MBA, the following assumptions are made.
Consider that the troops in the CFA are distributed along
a line, and that the MBA forces are distributed along a
second line, that is designated as the PEBA. Imagine that
all the Red forces face all the Blue forces along an infinite
homogeneous front (see fig. 2). Further suppose that the
relative strength of Red and Blue are so balanced that, were
the Red forces to attack within any sector of width, K meters,
without further concentration, then the resulting battle would
be a draw, and that at the end of the assault both sides would
have been destroyed within this attack sector. This situation
R2 .is known as parity, and is represented as —5 = — (Ref. 16).
B^ r
This must mean that Red forces outnumber the Blue forces by










A HYPOTHETICAL DEFENSIVE SCENARIO

The problem of the CPA is defined by inquiring whether
any advantage could be attained by the defenders if they
were to split their forces into two lines, one behind the
other, in some definite ratio of strengths, i.e., if Blue
had a finite initial strength, B , then some fraction, p,
(0 <C P "C 1 .0), would be committed to the first line (the
covering force initial strength would then be B p), and the
remainder, 1 - p, would occupy the second line. (The MBA
initial strength would then be B • (1 - p).
Within this defensive formation the Blues could take
advantage of the time delay in the advance of the Red forces
due to the combat of the CPA forces, to reinforce the PEBA
positions directly behind the threatened sector by drawing
in troops from adjacent positions along the PEBA (see fig. 3).
Several additional assumptions are required:
1 ) The assumed equality of Red and Blue strength will
be expressed, for the purpose of making the mathematical
calculation more transparent, as asserting that each side
has an equal number of troops, each with the same killing
power within any width of sector, i.e., Red and Blue
forces are equally distributed homogeneously over the
infinite width of the battlefield.
2) The CFA battle is not over until all the Blue
forces in the CPA are annihilated.
3) The time for the Red forces to move through the










RED FORCES ATTACK IN A SECTOR OF WIDTH, K.
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I4.) The movement of Blue adjacent units to thicken
the MBA stops when the MBA battle begins.
C. DERIVATION OF LANCHESTER EQUATIONS
The model conceptualized above is now translated into a
Lanchester-type model.
Let: R = number of Red forces
B = number of Blue forces
r = Red attrition coefficient








= initial number of Red forces attacking in
a sector of width, K.
CFA
B = initial number of Blue forces committed
to CPA in attacked sector.
RCFA _ n „B - B d
E'
MBA
= initial number of Blue forces deployed
along the FEBA in attacked sector,
the state equation becomes:
(BGFA ) 2 = B2 = | (R2 - R2 ) (3.2)
We assume that the individual elements of both Red and
Blue forces are equally effective, then r = b and r- = 1 .
Also, we assume that the covering force fights to anni-
hilation, B = 0. Then the number of Red forces, R-, that
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survive the CFA battle and will continue the attack upon the
FEBA, can be found in the expression:
r| = R2 - (BGFA ) 2 (3.3)
To determine the time of the duration of the CFA battle
it is necessary to first form an expression of the Blue force
level as a function of time, denoted at B(t). Solving for B
in equation (3«2) and substituting into the second differen-
tial equation in (3«1 )> and integrating, it is found that:
B(t) = h -f(BCFA - R,) e* + (B
GFA
+ R^j e -t (3.k)
(Ret. 17)
If the Blue covering force fights to annihilation, as
previously assumed, and t f is the time required for annihila-
tion to occur, (CFA battle duration), then the value of t f
can be found when 3(t~) = 0. Substituting yields:
I a, bcfa )






-TTnT i where u is the ratio of initial Red forces
SCFA
'
to initial Blue forces in the CFA, or, equivalently, the per-
cent by which the covering force is outnumbered.
Then (3«5) can also be written as:
»* *(ln g-=4) (3 - 6)
Let y be the number of reinforcing Blue troops that will
move from adjacent positions to thicken the threatened MBA
sector during the time of the CFA battle, tf . If we assume
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that these adjacent troops can move with some fixed speed, V,
then y can be expressed as follows:
y = 2x (number of troops in adjacent areas)
y = 2x(length of area) x (-ffSJM-^)
JMBA
y = 2x(V . tf ) • (2-^-) (3.7)
Consequently, the total number of Blue troops that can defend
the threatened MBA sector is equal to the number originally
present plus the number that can arrive from adjacent positions
in time, t~.






+ y = BQ (1
- p) + y (3.3)
For ease of calculation the above equations must be put
into "dimensionless form" (Ref. 19). This is accomplished by
choosing units of troop strength, time, and length as follows:
1 ) A unit of troop strength will be the total number
of Blue forces initially present in the sector of width,
K.
2) A unit of time will be the length of time required
for one unit of either side to kill one unit of the enemy.
3) A unit of width will be the width of the front,
K, (this choice gives, V, the units of width of front per
unit kill time).
Applying the above units of measurement, equations (3»3)>
(3.5)* and (3.7) reduce to a simpler form.
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The number of Red troops left after annihilating the Blue
covering force becomes:
and,





2 =\|1 - p
d (3.9)
The time of CPA battle is then determined from:
Rl + B
GFA
tf ~ * ^















tf = h m (fr-f) (3 - 10)
The number of arriving adjacent troops, y, expressed in
equation (3.7) now becomes:
y = 2Vtf
- (1 - p) (3.11 )
So, the total number of Blue defensive forces in the




- p) + y (3.9)
B
t
= 1 - p + 7 (3.12)
3k

In the MBA battle, the aimed fire state equation (1.3) is
again applied (assuming this time that Blue can annihilate





-\b5 - 4 ( 3- 1 3)




= 1 " P + ? (3.12)
To determine the total number of Blue casualties, C, the
number of Blue survivors must be subtracted from the total
number committed:
C = (total committed) - total survivors
C = (1 + y) - B,, (3.11+)
where C is expressed in dimensionless units.
D. RESULTS
For various percentages of the Blue force committed to
the CPA (p varies between .1 and .9) the Blue losses can be
plotted along a series of curves for each hypothesized value
of V (fig. Ij.).
While it is possible to express these results in the dimen-
sionless form used to simplify the expressions, the curves may
be more meaningful by assuming arbitrarily that;
1 ) the assault sector is 1 kilometer in width,
2) 3
q
= 1000 and R = 1000 ,
3) r = b = 1, that is, each Red and Blue combat
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Blue losses as a function of % initial strength
retained in the MBA and for various assumed speeds
of movement of reinforcing units. Red is annihilated.
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If.) V is measured in kilometers per hour.
It should be noted that, though in every case Blue loses the
CFA battle, the scenario has been contrained so that Blue
will win in the decisive MBA battle.
E. CONCLUSIONS FOR EQUAL FORCE RATIO
The results 3how that the optimum Blue strategy seems,
in every case, to favor retaining the bulk of its defensive
forces ( — 85%) in the MBA regardless of the speed of the
reinforcing adjacent units.
Obviously, with such a simple model, the drawing of con-
clusions is dangerous, but offers a means of developing
insights into the dynamics of the covering force and its con-
tribution to the overall defensive effort.
F. SUPERIOR ODDS
An enrichment of this model can easily be achieved by
relaxing the assumption requiring Red and Blue force level
equality in any sector width. Equation (3.6) can now be used
to calculate the CFA battle duration time, tf , for any force
level ratio:
tf = h in (H4) (3 - 6)
where u = force level ratio,
B
CFA
h| - if . (BCFA )2 (3.3)
can be used to determine the Red survivors of the CFA battle.
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y = 2x(V • tf ) • {2~y-) (3.7)
where: BmA - BQ- (1 - p)
and: B
t
= BQ. (1 - p) + y (3.9)
gives the number of Blue forces that will defend the threatened
MBA sector.
Solution of the aimed fire state equation for the MBA battle
will provide the number of Blue survivors
:
B =\ 4-43
The number of Blue casualties can then be found for each
hypothesized value of V by:
C = (B_ + y) - BQ (3.15)
For a 3:1 superiority in total Red forces over total Blue
forces in any width of sector, but retaining the assumption of
r = b = 1 , figure 5 shows the minimum speed with which the
reinforcing adjacent units must move in order to achieve parity
at the end of the MBA battle. Then, for Blue to win with any
survivors, the speed, V, of adjacent units must be greater
than the plotted curve. Notice that the minimum velocity
required to achieve parity occurs when 1+6% (p = .lj.6) of total
Blue is committed to CPA.
Figure 6 gives the total Blue losses as a function of
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r = b = 1
K s 1 Km.
G. CONCLUSIONS
Figure 5 shows that an optimum Blue strategy would commit
about 1|6% of its forces to the CPA. In this case, the opti-
mem deployment strategy will be defined as the p value that
achieves parity using the minimum speed of adjacent units as
a parameter. In this case, figure 5 reveals that minimum
speed is about 15 kph.
This example poses a limitation on the general applica-
tion of the results found in the first battle where a 1 :1
force ratio was assumed. In that case the optimum strategy
was to retain about 55% of forces in the MBA regardless of
the hypothesized V.
Figure 6 shows the optimum Blue strategy in the face of
3:1 odds with a fixed speed of V = 20 kph. The optimum tactic
now is to retain about 60% in the MBA (p = .l+O).
Thus, the optimum Blue tactic, from this model, seems to
require that large fractions be retained in the MBA when total
opposing sides are more nearly equal and that more forces be
committed to the CFA as the enemy superiority increases.
in

IV. AN APPLICATION OF SEVERAL LANCHESTER-TYPE
MODELS TO THE DEFENSIVE BATTLE
A. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter a series of cases will be presented that
will offer an opportunity for analysis of the crucial advan-
tages that must be gained in order to quantitatively justify
the tactics of organizing the defensive battlefield into two
areas, the CFA and the MBA.
From the discussion of Lanchester's original work in
Chapter I, it will be remembered that under the aimed fire
assumptions of modern warfare, the victor can significantly
reduce his casualties by concentration. A unit that could
concentrate all available forces on the battlefield was found
to be capable of overcoming a particular advantage in combat
effectiveness that an opponent might have, due to superior
firepower or organization.
The question now arises that if concentration is so advan-
tageous under modern conditions why is it that conventional,
U.S. defensive doctrine splits a defensive force into two
component forces? Currently, a defensive force of finite
size must be divided into two smaller forces to occupy the
CFA and the MBA. Since the terrain and distances are such
that neither the force in the CFA nor the force in the MBA
can assist each other with direct fire, then analysis by
Lanchester-type methods demands that two separate battles be
modelled, each with its own set of differential equations
h2

and initial force levels. This partition of the defensive
battle into two areas with a subsequent partition of defen-
sive forces, hardly seems to be in consonance with the prin-
ciple of concentration. Yet, this tactic in reality must
offer a tangible defensive advantage to be accepted doctrine.
It appears that there is a contradiction between classic
Lanchester theory and current defensive tactical doctrine.
Many military men may react adversely to the application of
Lanchester-type models to contemporary combat. This contro-
versy generates sufficient doubt in the conclusions found in
Lanchester' s aimed fire conditions to wonder whether modern
warfare has evolved beyond the state where attrition could
be modelled by a simple analytical model.
To explore this question of concentrating all forces in
the MBA versus having a covering force forward of the MBA
a sequence of simple cases will be presented. Each case will
be a simple application of Lanchester f s analytical models to
different defensive scenarios. It may be found that some
modelling assumptions will be difficult to accept initially,
but the reader is encouraged to continue since these aberra-
tions will be resolved.
B. CASE I
Consider a battle in which two homogeneous forces clash.
The Blue force is in a defensive posture and concentrates all
its available forces on a piece of terrain such that all Blue
elements can bring effective fire on the attackers. The Red

force outnumbers the Blue force by two to one, yet attacks
the Blue force in two echelons, one behind the other. Assume
that the defensive battle becomes two distinct battles wherein
the total Blue force must defend against the attack of the
Red first echelon and then the attack of the second echelon.
Blue forces receive no reinforcements during the entire con-
flict. Battle termination is determined using breakpoint
force levels in the fashion discussed in Chapter I. When
either Red or Blue reaches its own breakpoint force level the
battle ends, with victory going to the remaining force. Also
assume that, regardless of the victor in the first echelon
attack, Red first echelon survivors are assimilated into the
second echelon and thus increase the initial Red force size
for the second battle.
Because of the defensive posture of the Blue force, assume
that it has a combat advantage over the Red force. This advan-
tage will be reflected in its constant attrition coefficient,
b, which will remain constant over the entire conflict. Like-
wise, the attrition coefficient, r, of the Red forces will be
constant over the entire conflict and will be the same for
both the first and second echelon.
A simple diagram of the progress of the battle is portrayed
in figure 7. If we assign values to the constants, then the























Let: B = Blue force size = 1 500 troops
b = k
R^ = first Red echelon force size = 2000 troops





= toi:al aed strength = 3000 troops
r = 1
fgp = Red's breakpoint fraction =
.1+
fBp = Blue's breakpoint fraction = .5
It should be noted that the model is very sensitive to
battle termination criteria, i.e., the selection of break-
point fractions. In this chapter and in subsequent chapters
the breakpoint fraction of the Red force is lower than the
hypothesized value for an attacker presented in Chapter I.
The reason for this low breakpoint is that the Red force is
being portrayed in each model as a force that can suffer
high casualties and still continue the attack. Additionally,
it is modelled as a force that is willing to accept high
casualties in order to achieve its objectives.
The aimed fire state equation for the first echelon attack
is:
b(B2 - B2 ) = r(R2 - (R, • f^p )
2
)
Substitution of the above values reveals that Blue wins
the first battle with the number of Blue survivors being
Bf = 1187 troops. The Red survivors are found as R^ f
s




its breakpoint force level first, Blue can claim victory in
the first echelon battle. However, the Blue survivors must
face the second echelon attack with no reinforcements. The
Blue initial force size is simply the number of survivors,
Bf = 1187 troops; and the Red second echelon survivors is
R2 + R1 " "^BP
= 1 ^00 troops. The attrition coefficients and
breakpoint fractions remain the same, and the aimed fire
state equation for the second echelon attack is:
>2
_ Q2, _ ((R2 +Rl . f*p )
2
- ((R
2 +R, . f^p).^p )
2
)
b(B£ - B|) = r
|
Substitution reveals that once again the Red force reached
its breakpoint force level first and Blue can claim total vic-
tory with survivors, B„ = 85^4- troops.
The measures of effectiveness for the models in this paper,
as mentioned in Chapter II, will be Blue losses, L„, loss
ratio, R, loss difference, D, Red losses, LRJ and Blue victory
or defeat. These are calculated for this example and are as
follows
:
Blue losses, L„ = 6I4.6
Loss ratio, R = .283
Loss difference, D = — 1 63U
Red losses, LR = 2280
Blue victory
The values of the measures of effectiveness for each case




In the previous defensive scenario a more effective Blue
force concentrated in one area, and defeated a larger Red
force that attacked in two exhelons. In Case II the Blue
force will partition the battlefield into two areas (CPA/MBA)
and will commit a fraction of its total force into each area.
B p forces will be committed to the CFA as the covering force
and B • (1 - p) forces will remain in the MBA (o < p<* 1.0).
Once again the Blue forces will face a two echeloned attack
by a superior Red force, but will retain its combat advantage
over Red. Figure 8 diagrams the progress of this fight.
Assume that the covering force fights the first echelon
until the battle termination criteria has been reached. Then
the Red and Blue survivors of the CFA battle are incorporated
into the second echelon and MBA forces respectively, and the
second echelon attack commences against the MBA. Also assume
that the Blue covering force will not fight to annihilation,
but rather to a low breakpoint force level that will reflect
a tenacious CFA battle, but will not permit such an extreme
defeat as annihilation. Let the fraction of Blue forces com-
mitted to the CFA be p s •k-5» with a breakpoint fraction of
CFfgp .2. Then \\S% of the total Blue forces will be committed
to the CFA and will abandon the CFA when 20% of its original
force level is reached.
The aimed fire state equation for the CFA battle is
:

















CASE II: Blue commits a certain fraction, p , of total forces
forward as a covering force. Two battles compose
the defensive battle (CFA and MBA battles). No
increase in combat effectiveness is attained due




Substitution of the numerical values for this example
reveals that Red is victorious, with Red survivors, R, - = 1 500
JoP ' fBP
CFtroops. The Blue covering force survivors are B p . RP = 135
troops.
After incorporation of Blue and Red survivors the initial
force levels for the MBA battle can be determined where:
BMBA = BQ (1 - p) + BQp . f<j£ = 325 + 135 = 960 troops
and
Rj^ = Rp + R1f = 1000 + 1500 = 2500 troops.
Prior to the start of the MBA battle a breakpoint fraction
for the Blue forces must be hypothesized. For simplicity let
us adopt the value for the breakpoint fraction of a defender
MBAdiscussed in Chapter I. Then fBp = .5.
Since the Red and Blue attrition coefficients for the MBA
battle do not change from those hypothesized in the CFA battle,
the aimed fire state equation can be written as:
b (4ba-<W f*f) 2 ) =r (h2 2MBA ' RS
Substitution shows that Red wins the MBA battle with total
Red survivors for the entire defensive battle as R
s
= 1867
troops. Blue survivors are B„ = I4.8O troops.
The computed values for the measures of effectiveness for
this scenario are:
Blue losses, Lg = 1020
Loss ratio, R = .9
Loss difference, D = -113
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Red Losses, LR = 1133
Red victory
Comparison of the results of Case I and Case II indicate
that Blue concentration can mean the difference not only
between victory and defeat, but also in the severity of
defeat. Regardless of a ij.:1 relative combat effectiveness
ratio, Blue casualties were almost equal to Red casualties,
as seen in the loss ratio, R = .9, and the loss difference,
D = -113.
D. CASE III
Once again one must question the need of some percentage
of a defensive force being committed forward as a covering
force if the results in Case II adequately reflect the dynamics
of the defensive battle, within the limitations of an analyti-
cal model. Considering the tasks of the covering force as
discussed in Chapter II, a possible resolution to this dilemma
can be proposed. During the conduct of the CPA battle the
MBA forces should be able to take advantage of the time and
enemy intelligence provided to increase its own combat effect-
iveness. This can be accomplished realistically by movement
of forces within the MBA to meet identified Red thrusts and
the improvement of defensive positions, as well as certain
logistic improvements.
This idea has a great deal of intuitive appeal since one
would easily accept the assumption that the MBA forces could
make profitable use of accurate enemy intelligence and the
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extra time to react in such a fashion as to increase their
combat effectiveness.
In this scenario we differ from Case II only in attri-
buting to the MBA force an eight-fold increase in combat
effectiveness such that the MBA attrition coefficient, bp ,




is now the attrition coef-
ficient of the covering force, b,. does not differ in value
from the original b used in Gases I and II. Assume that the
Red has no increase in combat effectiveness between the CPA
and MBA battle. Figure 9 diagrams the progress of the Case
III defensive battle.
The aimed fire state equation for the CPA battle is:
*i (<v2) - <V • 4V) = r ( r2 - *?f )
Substitution reveals that Red wins the GFA battle with
survivors, R* f = 1 500 troops, and the Blue covering force
CF
survivors are B p • fBp =135 troops.
After incorporation of Blue and Red survivors the initial
force levels for the MBA battle can be determined (see Case
II) as:
BMBA
= 960 tro°P s
RMBA
= 2500 tro°P 3
In addition, the Blue MBA forces have increased their
combat effectiveness to b~ = 8b,. = 32.
The aimed fire state equation for the MBA battle is:






















CASE III: Blue commits a certain fraction, p, of total forces
forward as a covering force. Two battles compose
the defensive battle (CFA and MBA battles). An
increase in combat effectiveness is attained due






In this case Blue wins the MBA battle with the number of




The Red survivors, R„, are found in the battle termination
expression, R
s
= RMBA • fBp = 1000 troops.
In this case the measures of effectiveness are determined
to be
:
Blue losses, LB = 630
Loss ratio, R = .31
Loss difference, D = -1 388
Red losses, LR = 2000
Blue victory
Notice that these values for the measures of effectiveness
compare favorably with values found in Case I. At these par-
ticular force levels, breakpoints and attrition coefficients
for Red and Blue, it must be pointed out that for Blue to win
the final (MBA) battle as successfully as in Case I, the cover-
ing force must provide the MBA force with sufficient time and
information to allow it to improve its combat effectiveness
by a factor of eight. This factor is not the victory transi-
tion point, but merely the increase in the attrition coeffi-
cient that compares favorably with Case I. With our knowledge
of the interpretation of the Lanchester attrition coefficients
this means that each Blue combatant in the MBA must be able
to improve his average kill rate eight-fold. Whether this
achievement is possible depends upon the optimism of the
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analyst. For example, if Red and Blue are homogeneous tank
forces, and if each Blue tank kills, on the average, four Red
tanks an hour; and each Red tank kills, on the average, one
Blue tank an hour, then, b. = ij. and r = 1 . An increase in
combat effectiveness by a factor of eight in Blue's attrition
coefficient requires that each Blue tank must now kill, on
the average, thirty-two Red tanks an hour (bp = 8b
1
= 32).
The observant reader may be questioning the inherent
assumption that exists in this particular scenario concern-
ing the combat effectiveness of the Blue covering force sur-
vivors that participate in the MBA battle. In this case,
the assumption of homogeneous forces requires that all the
Blue MBA forces have the same constant attrition coefficient,
bp. Since the GPA survivors are incorporated into one homo-
geneous Blue force in the MBA that fights with combat effect-
iveness, bp = 8b- , this suggests that the covering force
survivors magically increase their combat effectiveness eight-
fold when they cross the FEBA. This is hardly realistic and
is acknowledged as being difficult to accept. However, in
order to keep the model simple and therefore transparent,
homogeneity of forces is assumed.
If two heterogeneous Blue forces exist in the MBA, prob-
lems such as Red distribution of fire between the two Blue
forces arise that serve only to complicate the analysis. The
reader can imagine, however, that if the covering force
survivors fought in the MBA battle with their original combat
effectiveness, b- , or less, then the original MBA force

(BQ • (1 - p)), would have to be able to increase its combat
effectiveness by an even greater amount to compensate for the
lower combat ability of the CPA survivors. This situation of
having two heterogeneous forces in the MBA cannot be ignored
and is incorporated in the computer model described in
Chapter V.
The intent of this example should not be lost. The cover-
ing force must provide the MBA forces some large advantage in
combat effectiveness for Blue to win and attain values of the
measures of effectiveness that compare favorably with those
values attained in Case I, where total concentration was
modelled. In order for comparable forces to produce compar-
able battle outcomes for Cases I and III it was necessary to
hypothesize rather unrealistic behavior for the covering
force. One must question the validity of this model since a
tremendous combat advantage had to be built into the MBA
battle.
E. CASE IV
The increase in combat effectiveness suggested by Case
III has an intuitive appeal, but one must balk at accepting
the magnitude of improvement required by the numerical example.
Some order of magnitude less than that needed in Case III
seems possible and probable. However, any degradation in
combat effectiveness would present a situation somewhere
between Case II and Case III, which would create an unfavorable
comparison between the covering force tactic and concentration
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presented in Case I. Obviously, there must exist additional
advantages that the commitment of the covering force can
provide to the MBA forces that can be modelled to make the
assumptions and results more realistic.
Recalling the discussion of the combat dynamics of the
current defensive doctrine in Chapter II and the analysis in
Chapter III, the possibility of modelling the movement of
adjacent units into the threatened MBA sector presents itself
as another enrichment that may more accurately capture the
dynamics of the defensive battle. If the covering force can
provide not only an increase in combat effectiveness, but also
the time to respond to information, the time to alert adjacent
units, and the time to move them into critical areas, then the
MBA forces will be able to fight with increased force size as
well as increased combat effectiveness. This idea will allow
one to present in Case IV a scenario that does not require
such a large increase in combat effectiveness to compare
favorably with Case I.
Let us consider that there are adjacent units on the
flanks of the MBA force that are not required in their par-
ticular sectors and are available to move to reinforce the
MBA during the duration of the CFA battle. Also assume that
the duration of the CPA battle is sufficient for the rein-
forcing units to arrive in the MBA and to achieve equal combat
effectiveness with the original MBA forces. In keeping with
the need for homogeneity within the MBA, we will also include
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the CFA survivors with the same stipulations and acknow-
ledgements mentioned in Case III. Figure 10 diagrams the
progress of this battle.
The covering force battle aimed fire state equation is
the same as in Case III with the same results. Red wins,
with survivors FL „ = 1500 troops. The Blue CFA survivors
CF
are B • p . f„p = 1 35 troops. After incorporation of the
CFA survivors and the adjacent Blue units, the initial Blue
force level in the MBA is:
^BA^o'' 1 -P> + BoPfIf + BL + BH
where BL and BR are force levels of the left and right rein-
forcing units.
The initial Red force level in the second echelon attack
is the same as in Case III.
^BA = R2 + R 1 f
Let the Blue reinforcing strength of BL and BR be,
BL + BR = 600 troops. Then the initial Red and Blue force
levels are:
Bj^BA = 825 + 135 + 600 = 1555 troops
RMBA
= 2500 tro°P s
Let us also assume a more realistic increase in Blue
combat effectiveness over the duration of the CFA battle, so
that b2 = 3b- = 12. Blue forces have more believably increased
their combat effectiveness three-fold. The aimed fire state




R are the left and right
adjacent Blue forces available to
thicken the MBA sector during the
CFA battle.













CASE IV: Blue force move adjacent units to thicken the MBA
and attain an increase in combat effectiveness due







" 4) = r ( HMBA - (RMBA * fB? )2 )
Substitution reveals that Blue wins the MBA battle with
B
s
= 1 24.07 troops, and Red once again being fought to its
breakpoint force level of R
3
+ RMBA • fgp = 1000 troops.
The measures of effectiveness are found as:
Blue losses, Lg = total Blue committed - Blue survivors
L
fi
= 1500 + 600 - 124.07 = 693
Loss ratio, R =
.
3k7
Loss difference, D = -1 307
Red losses, LR = 2000
Blue victory
P. RESULTS
Table I lists all four cases presented in this chapter
and the values of the five measures of effectiveness estab-
lished as a means of evaluating the covering force f s contri-
bution to the total defensive battle. All the measures of
effectiveness except Red losses, L~, are preferred at a mini-
mum. Obviously, Red losses are preferred by Blue at their
maximum value. Victory or defeat in the CPA battle can be
a misleading measure of effectiveness in evaluating the con-
tribution of the covering force, and should be avoided. As
seen in Cases II, III and IV, the covering force loses the
battle in the CFA. However, because of time and intelligence
gained by its action the Blue MBA can profit by thickening
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A commitment of a percentage of the total defensive force
that would be of sufficient size to insure victory in the
CFA would, in the numerical examples presented in this chap-
ter, reduce the force size in the MBA to such a level that,
regardless of the advantages attained, insufficient strength
would exist to win the final and decisive MBA battle. It
must be emphasized that the only correct way to determine
the contribution to the total defensive battle by the cover-
ing force is to analyze the outcome of the final battle, not
the outcome of the CFA battle.
G. CONCLUSIONS
The numerical examples presented in this chapter are only
a means by which the discrepancy between the principle of
concentration and the current defensive organization can be
explored, within the framework of the Lanchester differential
equations of modern warfare. The models presented are merely
excursions along paths suggested by the combat dynamics that
are easily quantified after making some simplifying assumptions.
They are also presented as a sequential enrichment process
that adapt Lanchester f s original work to the unique combat
dynamics of the CFA/MBA battles.
The original problem at the start of this chapter was
whether the principle of concentration, as discussed in Chap-
ter I, could be reconciled with the tactic of partitioning a
defensive force into a CFA and an MBA. To partition a finite
defensive force into two areas in this manner seems to defy
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the principle of concentration, wherein Lanchester's aimed
fire model suggested the best advantage. Yet this tactic is
adopted as defensive doctrine by the U.S. Army. Acknowledging
the limitations of the simple model, this controversy leads
one to question whether or not Lanchester^ original work is
still applicable or has failed to capture contemporary combat.
Case I illustrated that an outnumbered force can win
against a two echeloned attack when it can concentrate and
fight with a combat advantage. Case II portrayed the same
force, partitioned, against the same echeloned attack. In
this example the defending force was soundly defeated. Case
III suggested that, if the covering force could provide the
MBA force with an increase in combat effectiveness, then the
defender could win favorably in the final outcome. However,
the increase in combat effectiveness required was of such an
order of magnitude to make it unrealistic. Case IV elaborated
upon Case III and offered (as in Chapter III) the defender
the ability to thicken the threatened MBA sector during the
duration of the CFA battle with adjacent forces that were
available to move.
By this sequential method of elaborating upon the initial
aimed fire assumptions and equations of Lanchester, the dis-
crepancy between the principle of concentration and the com-
mitment of the covering force is reconciled. The covering
force must provide to the MBA at least two distinct advan-
tages, enemy intelligence and the time to react to that in-
telligence. Chapter II has gone into detail concerning how
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these advantages are to be actually obtained in combat. The
examples in this chapter serve to illustrate how these advan-
tages can be quantified and used to enrich the model. With
the original model manipulated in this fashion it can once
again grasp (albeit in a limited fashion) the dynamics of
the modern battlefield as organized by U.S. tactical defensive
doctrine, and serves to justify why such a tactic has been
adopted.
One particular factor that exists on the battlefield,
that has not been addressed or injected into any analysis
yet seen in this paper, is the element of surprise. Surprise
exists when one force presents itself on the battlefield in
such a manner as to negate its opponent's advantages in force
size or combat effectiveness. Certainly the covering force
serves as a means by which the defensive unit seeks to elimi-
nate the element of surprise in the MBA battle. If one would
attempt to model the situation wherein the covering force does
not eliminate the element of surprise in the MBA battle, it
is suggested that Case II would present a reasonable model of
this phenomenon. Any increase in combat effectiveness gained
by the MBA forces is negated and they must fight at their
original combat effectiveness. In Case II the Blue force
suffered severe defeat, and can serve as an illustration of
the importance of this particular task of the covering force.
The element of surprise and its effects has, in the past,
been difficult at best to quantify but must be recognized as
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a parameter that needs to be included in any combat model.
The enrichments that follow in subsequent chapters will
attempt to introduce this element as "well as resolve some
of the uncomfortable assumptions that have been adhered to
up to this point.
V. THE C0MPUT5R MODEL
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapters III and IV have presented some simple models
from which closed-form analytical solutions were easily
obtained and numerically evaluated with the aid of a hand-
held calculator. Unfortunately, some important aspects of
the combat dynamics had to be over simplified in order to
keep the model transparent and the calculations tractable.
For example, the assumption in Chapter IV that the covering
force survivors and reinforcements were incorporated into the
original MBA forces at the same level of combat effectiveness,
was needed to retain the concept of homogeneity of forces.
Obviously, this is not an acceptable assumption, and a more
complex model must be developed to allow for a more realistic
approach. In this chapter a model will be presented that will
take advantage of the modern, high-speed computer's ability
to make recursive and complicated calculations easy.
A certain reconciliation has been achieved between the
need for concentration and the need for a covering force
commitment in defensive combat as modelled by Lanchester-type
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differential equations. There is a need now to attempt to
answer the question of how many forces should be committed
to the covering force. For any combat situation, given Red
and Blue force levels, and their relative combat effective-
ness, it is submitted that there is some optimal percentage
of defensive forces that should be deployed in the covering
force area. The value of this fraction of p will be such
o
that the measures of effectiveness being used in this analy-
sis will be at their preferred levels. The intent of this
chapter and the model herein constructed is to evaluate by
an iterative approach on the digital computer the optimal
percentage, p , of the defensive forces that should be com-
mitted to the CFA.
B. THE SCENARIO
The general scenario used to construct the computer-based
model is essentially the same situation as presented in Case
IV, Chapter IV. The defensive battlefield is organized by
the Blue force into two areas, the CFA and the MBA. The Blue
force is attacked by a two echelon Red force, superior in
strength. The defensive battle reduces to two separate battles,
the CFA battle and the MBA battle. The CFA battle is between
the Blue covering force and the Red first echelon. The MBA
battle is between the Blue forces in the MBA (original force
plus covering force survivors and reinforcements that have
moved from adjacent positions to thicken the threatened MBA
sector) and Red second echelon attack (consisting of first
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echelon survivors and the original second echelon). During
the covering force battle the MBA forces are capable of in-
creasing their combat effectiveness and have time to move
a certain number of adjacent units to increase the MBA force
size. In contrast, the Red forces do not achieve an advan-
tage in combat effectiveness from the CPA to MBA battles
because of their attack posture. Again, separate differen-
tial equations are used to capture these essential dynamics
in the CFA and MBA in the same fashion as in Chapter IV.
C. USE OP FINITE-DIFFERENCE APPROXIMATIONS
The Lanchester differential equations are modified in
this model due to a more complex approach to modelling the
defensive battle. The specific modelling assumptions will
be addressed in section D of this chapter. Before the actual
modelling process is described, a brief discussion of the use
of finite-difference approximations and their applicability
to this model is in order.
It is accepted that it is impossible for all practical
purposes to solve analytically the differential equations for
any but the most simple Lanchester-type combat models. In
order to obtain approximate solutions to the more complex
equations numerical methods must be used.
One such metiiod is to use finite-difference approxima-
tions. These can be conveniently, numerically solved by
automated, iterative procedures on the digital computer (i.e.,
to do loop in Fortran). The method enables one to generate
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approximate values for the force levels at discrete points
in time (as opposed to continuous time) during the course
of the battle. Time is discretized by incrementing the
passing of time by small uniform time steps, At. At each
time step a finite-difference equation of the form
B




n <W ' At (5 ' 1 >
is solved for the B force level after each time step. By
applying such approximations to the continuous time combat
model (equation 1 .1 ) a discrete time model is obtained, for
which the values of the approximate force levels B and R
may be generated recursively at a finite number of time steps
for any interval of battle. The finite-difference equations
are not any easier to solve than the original differential
equations, but their structure makes recursive procedures
easy on a digital computer. The finite-difference equations
will be the basis for the modelling effort in this chapter,
which moves the battle results ahead in time with the approx-
imate Blue and Red force levels known at the old time step,
n, allowing the computer to approximate values for force levels
B * and R ,, . This recursive procedure continues until
n + 1 n + i F
a battle termination criteria has been met for each battle.
D. INITIAL MODELLING ASSUMPTIONS
The following assumptions are made:
1 ) The defensive battle consists of two separate battles,
the GPA and MBA battles (see section B, this chapter).
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2) The covering force survivors from the CPA battle
make a rearward passage of lines and are incorporated into
the MBA in such a fashion that they are uniformly distributed
throughout but retain the same combat effectiveness they
enjoyed in the CFA (i.e., the attrition coefficient of the
CFA survivors remains the same after incorporation into the
MBA). This will lead to a heterogeneous force in the MBA
and the relaxation of the assumption of homogeneity of
forces. The uniform distribution of these elements will
allow us to model their attrition by Red in proportion to ;
their numbers present on the battlefield.
3) The Red first echelon survivors of the CFA battle
are incorporated into the second echelon attack. This may
not accurately depict actual Red doctrine, but since no
accurate breakpoint fraction can be hypothesized, this assump-
tion makes this model more conservative.
I4.) The Blue and Red forces are of finite size where Red
outnumbers Blue at least 2:1 and Red attacks in two echelons
(i.e., Blue = 1500, Red = 3000).
5) The Blue forces enjoy a combat advantage over Red
forces which is reflected in the Blue and Red attrition coef-
ficients, i.e., b = 1 .2 and r = .2. This gives a combat
effectiveness ratio of — = -4* = 6. Blue forces are on the
r ,d
average six times more effective than Red forces.
6) The intensity of combat, \| b • r, is of such a magni-
tude that the covering force battle lasts approximately one
time interval (one day).
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7) The original MBA forces are capable of increasing
their combat effectiveness due to the time and enemy intel-
ligence gained by the action of the covering force in the
CFA. It would be more accurate to be able to model this
phenomonenon as being of the form b~ = g(t f , enemy intelli-
gence) where bp is the increased Blue MBA attrition coeffi-
cient, but the functional relationship between enemy in-
telligence and combat effectiveness is difficult to quantify.
No attempt is made in this paper to undertake this task.
The increase in combat effectiveness is merely portrayed as
a linearly increasing function over time, until some maximum
value of bp is reached (see figure 11). It is assumed that
the MBA forces are capable of attaining a maximum increase
in combat effectiveness if the GPA battle can last one day.
It is not reasonable to expect this increase to continue
beyond some maximum level that can be achieved in finite time.
As mentioned at the end of Chapter IV, surprise may
be represented by a negation of any combat advantage that the
MBA forces may achieve due to GPA action. It is reasonable
to expect that if the Red forces were able to penetrate the
CFA and reach the MBA prior to some preparation time, t
,
that the MBA forces would have to fight at a diminished capa-
bility represented by a diminished attrition coefficient.
Graphically, this is represented in Figure 12.
8) The beginning of the CFA battle sees the covering
force engaging the Red first echelon from battle positions
that make maximum use of terrain and the extended ranges of
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BLUE MBA ATTRITION COEFFICIENT
bp(max)
original b
b2 = b2 (max)
time
Linear increase in combat effectiveness of MBA forces
over time, where b^dnax) is the maximum value possible to




BLUE MBA ATTRITION COEFFICIENT
bp(max)
bp = bp(max)
b = b ; b = b(surprise)
£mm 5 S
time
Linear increase in combat effectiveness of MBA forces
over time, t < t , MBA forces are surprised and must fight
at a diminished combat effectiveness, t < t <" 1 , MBA forces
are capable of gaining a linear increase in combat effective-




organic weapons. These ambush techniques make effective Red
aimed fire against the Blue covering force elements difficult.
As the battle continues over the expanse of the covering
force area Red forces become increasingly more capable of
pinpointing individual covering force elements and can engage
them with accurate aimed fire. Thus, the initial CPA battle
can be modelled as in the Dietchman ambush model where the
Blue covering force engages the Red first echelon with aimed
fire, but the Red forces can only engage suspected covering
force positions with area fire.
As the battle progresses a transition is made from
the pure ambush model to the pure aimed fire model. This
transition is expressed as:
As t gets larger the equation approaches the aimed
fire finite difference equation.
9) The time between the end of the CPA battle and the
beginning of the MBA battle cannot realistically be considered
instantaneous. Additionally, the outcome of the GFA battle
will have some effect on this time lapse. For example, if
the covering force is successful in defeating the Red first
echelon one can readily expect that the time required for the
second echelon to prepare its assault against the MBA would
be longer than if the first echelon could defeat the covering
force. More time would be required to launch the second
echelon attack if the Red force had to recover from the defeat
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of its first echelon. However, when the first echelon attains
victory over the covering force, the time required to attack
the MBA should be less. This idea is modelled, depending on
the CFA winner, by increasing the time of the start of the
MBA battle from the end of the CPA battle by two different
time increments; one smaller than the other, i.e., if the
first echelon wins the CFA battle, the MBA battle starts 2.1;
hours later (.1 days). If the covering force wins the CFA
battle, the MBA battle starts 6.0 hours (.25 days) after the
end of the CFA battle. This procedure gives an added advan-
tage to the MBA force in the computation of its new attri-
tion coefficient, b~, when Blue wins in the CFA. When Blue
does not win the CFA battle the time lapse is not of suffi-
cient length to allow much more of an increase in combat
effectiveness than attained over the actual duration of the
CFA battle.
10) The movement of adjacent units to thicken the threat-
ened MBA sector is modelled by first determining the maximum
number of forces, left and right, that are available to move.
If these forces can move at a constant rate then the number
of reinforcements is a linear function with respect to time,
until such a time that the maximum number can thicken the
MBA. However, one must accept that the movement of reinforc-
ing units cannot happen instantaneously, but only after the
CFA battle has progressed beyond a certain time in which
enemy intelligence can be processed, orders disseminated and
Ik

movement begun. A Red penetration to the MBA (surprise)
would find the MBA forces at their minimum force level
(B • (1 - p) with no increase due to arriving lateral rein-
forcements. The maximum number of reinforcements available
can be a variable input into the model. Graphically, this
simple subroutine is depicted in figure 1 3.
11) The reinforcing units arrive in the threatened MBA
sector in a continuous manner and not in discrete quantities
as moving company-sized units would. They also arrive at a
level of combat effectiveness that is lower than the original
MBA forces since the reinforcing units have not had the same
amount of time to prepare for the MBA battle. For ease in
modelling the reinforcing units are incorporated into a homo-
geneous group with the covering force survivors. All elements
of this group when in the MBA have the 3ame attrition coeffi-
cient and distribution over the battlefield.
12) Breakpoints are included for both forces in both
battles. The Red breakpoint fraction is constant over the
R
entire defensive battle and has a value of f„p = .i± for
reasons stated in Chapter IV. The Blue breakpoint fractions
are modelled differently between the GPA and the MBA. To
reflect the tenacious battle that the covering force must
fight and the possibility of its annihilation a low break-
point fraction of fop = .2 is modelled. The MBA forces, on
the other hand, are modelled with the standard defensive









INCREASE IN BLUE REINFORCEMENTS OVER TIME
t <t BLUE REINFORCEMENTS = 0.0
P
t ^ t^ 2.0 BLUE REINFORCEMENTS INCREASE LINEARLY
P





The computer program is listed in Appendix C. The output
consists of 91 (for each value of .1^ p ^..9) in increments
of .01 ) different force level attrition curves that show the
force decays over time of the total Red and Blue forces. The
jump in force levels shows the beginning of the MBA battle
when the Red force is increased by its second echelon and
the Blue force is increased by the MBA forces and reinforcing
units. Accompanying each force level attrition graph is a
list of initial force levels for each battle, C?A battle
duration time, the winner of each battle and number of sur-
vivors. If Red wins the battle a zero is printed. If Blue
wins the battle a one is printed (see figures M\. through 16).
At the end of the 91 sequential battles the values of
the measures of effectiveness are graphed versus the corres-
ponding value of p. A visual means is then provided for
determining the optimum range for the percentage of forces
to be committed forward as a covering force. The effects and
sensitivity of particular values of force levels, attrition
coefficients, and breakpoint fractions may be evaluated using
this program.
P. RESULTS
The graphs for the measures of effectiveness versus p for
the specific values of the input variables presented in Appen-
dix G (i.e., Red to Blue force level ratio is 2:1; 3000:1500)
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A3 can be seen, the preferred Blue tactic is to commit
forward as a covering force about i+0% of its total force.
The MBA battle was won by Blue in the p range, .29^ p
-^ .51.
It must be emphasized that this optimum value of p is
merely that specific value that is preferred given the speci-
fic values of the controlled variables. It is interesting
that in this case and the subsequent cases used for sensiti-
vity analysis the covering force never won the CFA battle.
G. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Many additional runs of this model were made to determine
its sensitivity to adjustments in the controlled variables
(force levels, attrition coefficients, breakpoint fractions,
and the maximum number of Blue reinforcements).
It was found that if the covering force is made to fight
to annihilation the optimum value of p is about .30. This
simply means that a smaller force fighting to annihilation is
as effective as a larger force that breaks the battle prior
to annihilation (see figure 21).
If the covering force is modelled to break off the CPA




was found that the preferred tactic was to concentrate the
majority of forces in the MBA, but at no time was the Blue
side victorious in the MBA battle.




.6) it was found that the preferred Blue tactic








































































the concentrated Blue forces were more effective at attriting
the Red rapidly to its high breakpoint force level. No
interior value of p was found to be optimum.
When the maximum number of available Blue reinforcements
is increased a more precise value of p is attained (see figure
22).
When enemy superiority becomes too great (i.e., 3:1) in
comparison with the Blue defensive forces and the maximum
number of Blue reinforcing units, the preferred Blue tactic
is to concentrate all forces in the MBA. However, sheer
enemy numerical superiority defeats the Blue force in both
battles for all values of p.
H. CONCLUSIONS
The more complex computer-based model presented in this
chapter allowed for a more realistic portrayal of the defen-
sive battle. The preferred Blue tactic is to commit 30$ "to
1+0% of all available forces forward as a covering force. If
the Red forces could be routed easily or if the covering force
were to fight to annihilation, it was found that fewer forces
need be committed to the CFA. As enemy numerical superiority
increased this model indicated that concentration in the MBA
is the preferred tactic. In other words, using the language
of mathematical programming, we may say that no "interior-


































































A. METHODS OP ANALYSIS
1 • Basis of Analysis
The method of analysis used in this thesis depended
upon using Lanchester-type differential equations to represent
attrition in combat governed by the defensive doctrine of
organizing the battlefield in two areas, the covering force
area (CFA) and the main battle area (MBA). Initially a con-
tradiction was apparent between the conclusions of Lanchester
theory with regard to the benefits of concentration and the
tactic of splitting a defensive force in order to deploy a
covering force forward. This contradiction was sufficiently
resolved to show that a Lanchester approach to the defensive
battle could capture the advantages of such a tactic when key
combat dynamics were incorporated into the model (i.e., time,
increased combat effectiveness and thickening of the MBA in
threatened areas).
2. Gamow-Zimmerman Model
Chapter III presented a simplistic and general approach
to the concept of the two force defensive battle by viewing
the covering force battle as an opportunity to move as many
adjacent forces into the threatened MBA sector as possible
with the time provided by the delaying actions of the cover-
ing force. The possible average speeds of these adjacent
units was found to be a critical factor since the quicker the
movement of these forces the more the force level could be
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increased in the MBA over the duration of the GFA battle.
Within the limitations of this model, it was found that when
opposing sides were more nearly equal only a small fraction
need be deployed forward to provide the time required to in-
crease the MBA force level sufficiently to win the MBA battle.
However, when the defending force faced increased odds a
greater fraction of forces had to be committed to the GFA in
order to provide the time for a greater number of adjacent
forces to move into the MBA sector. As enemy numerical
superiority increased'a greater percentage had to be committed
to the CFA to gain the needed movement time.
In order to achieve victory in the MBA, the minimum speed
of the reinforcing units and the percentage, p, of forces
committed to the CFA had to increase as the enemy's numerical
superiority increased. Simply stated, this result says that
the ability to concentrate in the MBA depends on time and
speed. The longer the duration of the CFA battle and the
quicker the adjacent forces can move, the greater the increase
in the force level in the critical MBA sector.
Unfortunately, the Lanchester-type equations are unable
to portray a gain in time by the covering force as being
achieved by any other means than an increase in the percen-
tage of forces committed to the GFA. If the attrition coef-
ficients are constant over time the only means of increasing
battle duration is by increasing the force levels. This is
why, when more time is required to reach a winning force level
in the MBA (at a fixed movement speed of adjacent units) a
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greater percentage must be committed to the CFA. The key
point to consider from this insight is that when the cover-
ing force can gain time by means other than force on force
attrition, more forces can be retained in the MBA and the
need for the rapid relocation of forces to thicken threatened
MBA sectors is reduced. A natural means of achieving this
increase in CFA battle duration is by the maximum use of
obstacles and constricting terrain by the CFA forces. In
this fashion, a smaller covering force can gain time by
slowing the enemy advance to the FEBA using other means
than just continuous force on force combat.
3. The Computer Model
The speed and ease with which recursive complex
calculations can be accomplished on the digital computer per-
mitted the formulation of a model that could portray a more
detailed and realistic defensive battle. The transition
from area to aimed fire attrition in the CFA, the action of a
heterogeneous MBA force and the functional increase in combat
effectiveness and reinforcements over time was easily modelled
on the computer by using finite-difference approximation
equations. In addition, the nonlinear problem of determining
the optimum covering force commitment was solved by succes-
sively increasing the percentage of forces committed to the






A Two Force Defensive Battle
Probably the most critical assumption underlying
every model presented has been that the defensive battle
is composed of two separate and distinct battles; the CFA
battle and the MBA battle. This assumption has allowed the
separate application of Lanchester-type differential equations
to the CFA battle and then the MBA battle.
2. A Combat Advantage
The only means of manipulating the Lanchester-type
models in order to capture the key dynamics of the covering
force battle is to provide the MBA force a functional combat
advantage over the duration of the CFA battle. This combat
advantage has been reflected in two ways. These are the
increase in combat effectiveness reflected in an increased
attrition coefficient, and the increase in the force level
in the MBA due to the movement of available adjacent units
over the duration of the CFA battle. If these key dynamics
are omitted from the application of Lanchester theory it no
longer becomes an accurate tool for the evaluation of cover-
ing force effectiveness.
3. Homogeneous Forces
With the exception of the computer model, where ease
of calculation was not a problem, the need for simplicity and
transparency demanded that each phase of the defensive battle
be modelled as conflicts between homogeneous forces. Even in
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the computer model the number of heterogeneous forces was
kept at a minimum (i.e., two).
i|. Enemy Numerical Superiority
Each model has assumed, at a minimum, an enemy numer-
ical superiority of 2:1, where the enemy has attacked in two
echelons.
5. Superior Friendly Combat Effectiveness
Each model has assumed that the Blue forces fight
the battle with a superior combat effectiveness that is
reflected in their larger constant attrition coefficient.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions of the analysis are as follows:
1 ) A Lanchester-type analysis is applicable when the
basic theory is manipulated to include the key dynamics of
the total defensive battle. There is no contradiction
between accepted tactical defensive doctrine and the prin-
ciple of concentration when a complete Lanchester model is
constructed.
2) Time and enemy intelligence are the key contribu-
tions of the covering force to the total defensive battle.
3) The effectiveness of any covering force commitment
can only be determined by the final outcome of the MBA battle.
k) The optimum percentage of defensive forces to be com-
mitted forward as a covering force is in the range of 30% to
lj.0%. This depends greatly on the force levels, breakpoints,
and the relative combat effectiveness of the opposing forces.
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5) The covering force should prolong the duration of
the CFA battle not only by force on force attrition, but
also by slowing the enemy rate of advance through the max-
imum use of obstacles in the CFA. This additional time will
allow the defensive forces to concentrate more forces in the
threatened MBA sectors.
6) The greater the speed of reinforcing units the greater
the force level can be increased in the threatened MBA sectors.
D. ENRICHMENTS AND FURTHER STUDY
This paper has presented only simple models to conduct
its analysis. Possible enrichments and areas of further
study are as follows:
1 ) Formulate a functional increase in the combat effec-
tiveness that is more representative of reality than in in-
creasing linear function.
2) Hypothesize battle termination criteria that is more
accurate than the breakpoint fractions used in this paper
(see Appendix B).
3) Portray the forces in the MBA as consisting of at
least three different heterogeneous forces with different
combat capabilities (i.e., the original MBA forces, the
arriving reinforcements, and the covering force survivors).
Ij.) The search for an optimum value of p, the fraction
committed to the GFA, is essentially a nonlinear program
that has been solved iteratively on the computer. The for-
mulation of a nonlinear program that can be solved determin-
istically is an area for future research.
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5) A movement model may be incorporated into the com-
puter model that will determine not only attrition but also
movement of forces.
6) More extensive sensitivity analysis may be conducted
to determine more exactly the affects of variation of such







« Covering Force Area (CFA) : In defensive operations, the
covering force area starts at the line of contact and ends at
the forward edge of the Main Battle Area. Forces in the CFA
are deployed to find the enemy and fight him with sufficient
force to cause him to reveal the location of his main thrust.
(Ref. 20).
2. FEBA: The forward edge of the (main) battle area (Ref.
21 ).
3. Main Battle Area (MBA) : That area extending back from
the FEBA to the rear boundaries of the unit's subordinate
elements. It is in this area that the decisive defensive
battle will be fought (Ref. 22).
[j.. Covering Force :
a. A covering force provides the main body early warn-
ing, reaction time, maneuver space, and information about the
enemy. It is a tactically self-contained security force
which operates at considerable distance to the front of a
moving or stationary force. Its mission is to develop the
situation early and to defeat the enemy if possible. If the
latter is not possible, then the covering force deceives,
delays, and disorganizes the enemy until the main body can
effectively react.
b. In defensive operations, a covering force operating
apart from the main body has four basic tasks:
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(1 ) Force the enemy into revealing the strength,
location, and general direction of his main attack.
(2) Deceive the enemy or prevent him from deter-
mining the strength, dispositions, and location of friendly
forces, especially in the MBA,
(3) Strip the enemy of his air defense umbrella, or
force him to displace his air defense before attacking the
MBA.
(If.) Gain time for the main body, enabling it to
deploy, move, or prepare defenses in the MBA (Ref. 22).
5. Battle Position : A location selected as a result of
terrain and weapon analysis from which units can defend,
block or attack. They can be selected for occupation by
units as large as a task force or as small as a platoon
(Ref. 23).
6. Delay : A defensive operation to fight an enemy force -
usually in a specified area or a given sector and often for
a specified period of time - in order to gain time for
friendly forces to concentrate or deploy elsewhere (Ref. 21;).
7. Passage of Lines : An operation in which one unit moves
either forward or rearward through positions held by another




SOME INDEPENDENT THOUGHTS ON BATTLE TERMINATION
As mentioned in Chapter I and in several of the refer-
ences, the battle termination criteria that adheres to the
breakpoint hypothesis depends upon attaining at some time
in the battle a certain force level below which a given unit
is no longer capable of completing its mission. It should
be noted that there is no consideration given to how quickly
the unit reaches this level. The rate of attrition, the
number of casualties sustained per unit time, may be rapid
or slow as the force level approaches its breakpoint. If a
battle is intense, with many casualties sustained in a small
interval of time, it is possible and realistic that a unit
would abandon the battlefield earlier (at a higher force level)
than if the battle were not very intense.
It is remembered from the brief discussion in Chapter I
that the attrition rate is expressed as - ^, and is graphi-
cally the slope of the force level versus time curve at any
point (see figure 23). The more intense the battle, the
steeper the slope of the force level curve. If one compares
the force level graph of a unit in an intense battle with
the force level graph of the same unit in a less intense
battle, the breakpoint force level, BBp , may be the same

















A COMPARISON OF TWO RATES OF ATTRITION
FOR DIFFERENT INTENSITIES OF BATTLE
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Let us now consider a unit of initial force size, X ,
that is sufficiently prepared mentally and physically for
combat. Let us believe that this is also a well disciplined
unit that is capable of sustaining action in an intense com-
bat environment for short periods without suffering any
anciety at experiencing rapid attrition. Let us also assume
that this unit has a breakpoint force level, XBp , below which
it is no longer combat effective.
It is submitted that a unit that is well disciplined and
experienced can initially suffer a large number of casualties
in a short period of time (a high attrition rate) and sustain
no degradation in its fighting spirit. But, after a longer
period of time of continuous high attrition a certain force
level is reached below which a certain paranoia or anxiety
sets in. At this force level the unit realizes that if
casualties are to be continuously sustained at the current
rate or at a more severe rate, then the decimation of its
force in finite time becomes increasingly likely. If the
attrition of this unit continues at a high rate then it is
probable that the unit will abandon the field of battle
(battle termination) at a force level higher than its hypo-
thesized breakpoint, due solely to the attrition rate.
However, if the intensity of the battle decreases and the
attrition slows, it is more likely that the unit will retain




Graphically this situation is depicted in figure 25.
Irregardless of the attrition rate above the "anxiety level"
X., the unit will continue to fight. Below the anxiety
level, if the attrition rate is not too severe the unit will
not lose its composure, and will continue to fight until its
original hypothesized breakpoint, XBp , is reached. But if
the unit sustains casualties at a fast rate (a high attrition
rate = a steep slope) the unit will lose its composure and
abandon the battlefield at a higher force level, X~.
This relationship can be expressed mathematically as
Termination = F(X) for XA < X< XQ , where XA = fA . XQ
(0<f?< 1), fv being the fraction of force size at which
anxiety sets in). The attrition rate makes no difference
above the amxiety level, XA , But for X^ XA , any force
dx
level below X A , if the attrition rate - tt is greater thanA xx ww »w„*-.v-w- *— - dt
dx
dtsome critical attrition rate (- ^T ) the unit, X, will
crit
stop fighting.
Now the battle termination is a function of not only the
force level, but also the rate of attrition.
dx
Termination = F (X,
-gg)
It is easy to see that as the battle continues each
casualty sustained reduces the force level by one element.
If one considers that at each decrement of the force level
a new anxiety level is reached then a new, but less severe,
critical attrition rate could determine battle termination.
Thus, as the unit ! s force level decreases, the critical





A unit with initial force size, X , may fight to its
breakpoint force level, XBp . Or if its attrition rate
exceeds some critical value below the anxiety level, XA ,
it will break early at X„.
BREAKPOINT VARIABILITY DUE TO ATTRITION RATE
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decreases. Naturally, if the intensity of combat never
presents an attrition rate that exceeds this critical rate,
then the unit retains its composure and continues to fight
to its original breakpoint force level.
Graphically this decreasing value of the critical attri-
tion rate versus the force level is seen in Figure 26. As
the force level decreases below the anxiety level, the mag-
nitude of the critical attrition rate decreases. In real
terms this equates to the situation explained above, where a
unit in continuous combat is unable to face a certain attri-
tion rate as its force size decreases. The more its force
size decreases, the smaller becomes the rate of attrition it
can successfully sustain, without breaking.
No attempt will be made to present likely numerical values
for the critical attrition rates for any force level, or even
to postulate at what percentage the anxiety level should be
placed. However, a numerical example is in order.
Suppose that a tank company (17 tanks) occupies a defen-
sive position with the mission to defend. Assume that this
company has experienced combat and is disciplined and confi-
dent in its ability to sustain heavy combat. Further assume
that in modelling this company's fight an hypothesized break-
point of 30% of its original strength is proposed. The company
position is attacked by a superior force and the company begins
to take casualties in men and tanks. After 30 minutes of
fighting the company has lost four tanks and crews. The attri-





LBP<- X. force level
decreasing force level
FIGURE 26
FUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FORGE LEVEL
AND THE CRITICAL ATTRITION RATE
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30 minute time period the company is at about 80% of its
original strength (1 3 tanks). If the intensity of the battle
continues at its present level, after \\% minutes the company
has lost (3/i| hr) • (8 tanks/hr) = 6 tanks and is at about 65%
of its original strength.
If the current battle intensity continues, the company
should realize that in another hour and 15 minutes the company
will be almost completely annihilated. At this point (65% of
original strength) the disciplined unit reaches a force level
below which a certain anxiety sets in. If the intensity of
the battle decreases and only one tank is lost over the next
80 minutes (attrition rate = 1 tank/. 5 hr = 2 tanks/hr) the
company can retain its composure and continue to fight to its
original hypothesized breakpoint, 30% of its initial strength.
However, if the intensity of the battle continues or becomes
more severe, then the company may lose four or five tanks in
the next 30 minutes and abandon its position at a force level
of about [f.0% of its initial strength. Figure 2? illustrates
these two situations.
In this case the tank company will break from the battle
at a higher force level than the hypothesized breakpoint due










An illustration of a tank company breaking from an
engagement prior to its hypothesized breakpoint force
level due to a high attrition rate after passing its
anxiety level.





The variables used in this program are listed in the order
of their occurrence.
DT: the time increment
G: the transition factor that determines the speed of
transition between area and aimed fire over the
course of the CPA battle.
B: the initial Blue force level.
RR1 : the initial Red first echelon force size.
R2 : the initial Red second echelon force size.
BRMAX: the maximum number of available Blue reinforcements
to the threatened MBA sector.
B1 : the Blue covering force attrition coefficient.
R: the Red attrition coefficient, same for first and
second echelon.
B2MAX: the maximum Blue attrition coefficient that can be
attained by MBA forces.
B21 : the attrition coefficient of the Blue MBA forces is
they are surprised.
PR: the hypothesized breakpoint fraction of the Red forces
(same for first and second echelon).




PMB: the hypothesized breakpoint fraction of the all Blue
forces in the MBA.
TM: the time lapse between the end of the CFA battle and
the start of the MBA battle when Blue wins the GFA
battle.
TT: the time lapse between the end of the CPA battle and
the start of the MBA battle when ited wins the GFA
battle.
NU: the exponent of the functional increase in combat
effectiveness as determined in subroutine NB2 (for
a linear increase, NU = 1 ).
P: the percentage of Blue forces committed to the GFA
(0<:p< 1 .0).
BGFA(J): the Blue covering force level at any instant of time.
R1(J): the Red first echelon force level at any instant of
time.
T1(J): the time of the CFA battle at any instant.
TP1 : the duration of the CFA battle.
BCFAF: the Blue covering force level at the end of the GFA
battle (covering force survivors).
TS: the time of the start of the MBA battle.
BMBA(M): the force level of the original Blue MBA forces at
any instant of time.
BR: the number of Blue reinforcing elements determined
from Subroutine Thick.
RMBA(M): the force level of Red forces attacking the MBA at
any instant of time.
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M3AF(M): the total Blue force level in the MBA at any instant
of time.
T2(M): the time of the MBA battle at any instant.
BMBAF: the Blue force level at the end of the MBA battle
( Blue survivors )
.
RMBAP: the Red force level at the end of the MBA battle
(Red survivors).
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